INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure to contribute to the volume in honour of Piet Sevenster.
I had the great good fortune to be a graduate student in Oxford when Niko Tinbergen moved to Oxford from Leiden. After his departure from the Netherlands, the tradition he established in Leiden was maintained primarily by Jan van Iersel and Piet Sevenster, who have extended the embryonic science in new and sophisticated directions whilst maintaining the initial and basic principles. Ethologists owe each of them a great debt. In the intervening years my own work moved gradually towards the study of human behaviour, and especially child development. Concurrently, some biologists have made far-reaching claims for the power of biological principles in the explanation of human social behaviour. Such claims have been fiercely resisted by many social scientists, who claim that biology is irrelevant to the complexities of the human condition. In this paper I argue that an understanding of the human condition does indeed require us to take account of biological principles but that some biologists tend to overestimate the range of their direct applicability (see also BOYD & RICHERSON, 1985) . Specifying the extent of their relevance depends on distinguishing successive levels of social complexity-interactions, relationships, group structure and, superimposed on all of these, sociocultural structure.
ANIMALS AND HUMANS
The resistance of many social scientists to the view that studies of animals can contribute to the understanding of human behaviour is understandable.
Not only are human cognitive abilities far superior to those of any animal, but they permit the development of spoken languages which themselves have further consequences for cognition.
Language in turn permits the development of discrete cultures, which are different in kind from the proto-cultures sometimes claimed for animal species (MAINARDI, 1980) . The language-based capacity for differentiated cultures has fundamental implications for individual development, affecting virtually all aspects of behaviour and experience. It permits members of each human group to share linguistic symbols, and thus to classify natural phenomena and impose order on the world in ways that are more or less specific to that group. It permits also the manipulation of the concepts thus formed to make higher-order concepts, and the labelling of relationships so that they can be classified into types. This in turn permits the existence of a limited set of roles, each with its attendant rights and duties, within institutions within each society. Another barrier to the transference of lessons from the study of animal behaviour to our own species lies in the very diversity of animals and of human cultures: it is too easy to find parallels that will substantiate any hypothesis. Furthermore it is far from easy to specify the level of analysis at which parallels should be attempted.
But direct parallels between animals and humans are, in most cases, not what we should be looking for. Rather we must use the relative simplicity of the animal case to abstract principles that can then be applied to the human case.
LEVELS C)F SOCIAL COMPLEXITY
If biological principles are to be applied to human behaviour, it is essential to distinguish successive levels of social complexity within human behaviour and to be constantly aware of the dialectical relations between them (HINDE, 1987) .
Social behaviour usually involves interactions between two or more individuals.
When two individuals interact on more than one occasion, and each interaction is affected by the preceding ones, we speak of them as having a relationship.
Each relationship is set within a group, and each group overlaps with or is juxtaposed with other groups (HINDE, 1979) . Each of these successive levels of social complexity has properties that are not relevant to the preceding levels. For example 'synchrony' is relevant to an interaction but not to the behaviour of an individual in isolation: and within a group relationships may be arranged centrifocally or linearly-issues not relevant to individual relationships. Each level influences, and is influenced by, other levels ( Fig. 1 ).
